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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF VERNAL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case Nos.

Defenda;nt,
P. H.

LO"\V~E,

7794 and 7795

Defendant and Appellant,

':--ALBORG B. T. LOWE,
Appellant.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
This is an action brought by the Bank of Vernal to
quiet title to certain land (Tr. 1) in which the defendant,
P. H. Lowe, set up the defense of the statute of limitations and cross complained for the quieting of title in
himself on the grounds of adverse possession ( Tr. 40).

FACTS
The land in litigation is located about 4 miles east
of Roosevelt, Utah, and consists of a string of four 40Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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acre tracts running south from Highway 40, marked on
Exhibit 2 as tracts A, B, C, and D. It is bottom land
('Tr. 64, line 13) and adjoins, along its eastern edge, the
home ranch of the defendant, P. H. Lowe and his sister,
Val borg Lowe (Tr. 60, line 8). The four forty's in dispute had been in possession of the Lowes since about
1919 (Tr. 142, line 26). Miss Valborg Lowe owned the
four forty's but mortgaged them to Herron (Tr. 84, line
18), who purchased them on mortgage foreclosure in
1932 (Abstract of Title, Exhibit A, entry 18).
In 1933 and 1934 Miss Valborg Lowe had a lease
with an option to buy the land in dispute from Herron
(Tr. 139, line 24). Herron mortgaged the land to the
Bank of Vernal (Abstract of Title_, Exhibit A, entry
23), and the mortgage was foreclosed by the Bank in 1939
(Abstract of Title, Exhibit A, entry 27), and in the same
year the land was bought by the Bank on mortgage foreclosure for One ($1.00) Dollar (same exhibit and entry).
The water to irrigate having been lost in 1935, and
there being no other water since ( Tr. 122, line 12), the
land in dispute was used by P. H. Lowe for pasturage
from 1934 to the time of trial (Tr. 64, line 7). He was
on the land "pretty near every day" (Tr. 64, line 15) and
sa'v it every day (Tr. 66, line 11). No one else has been
on it nor plowed it (Tr. 66, line 26). He used it all the
time (Tr. 67,-line 13) for grazing cattle, sheep, and horse~
(Tr. 67, line 28). He put sheep on the disputed tracts in
the 1nornings and took the1n back to the home ranch at
night (Tr. 69).
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The tracts in dispute are fenced. The north forty,
tract ~-\., is wholly enclosed 'vith a woven and barbed wire
fence ( Tr. 61). The same is true of the next forty, ·B
(Tr. 62). Tracts C and D, the south two forty's are
enclosed together, being separated from tract B by a
wove~ 'vire fence (Tr. 62, line 16), from the land on the
west by a barbed wire fence (Tr. 62, line 25; Tr. 63, line
6), from the land on the south by a barbed 'Y.ire fenc~
(Tr. 63, line 10), and from the land on the east by a threestrand barbed wire fence a1.ong the
·east
side from the
.
.
cross fence between tracts B and C down along tract D
(Tr. 168, line 17).
There are no entrances in the fences on .the· north,
west, o:t- south sides .of the four forty's, but the only entrances are from .the east, where these tracts join the
Lowe property ( Tr. 62, 63).
There have been fences around the land in dispute
from 1934 (Tr. 64, lines 1 to 3), but those there at that
time had to be rebuilt (Tr. 122, lines 1 to 6). The present
fences are tight (Tr. 63, line 30),- being in part woven
wire supplemented with barbed wire and in part just twoand three-strand barbed wire (Tr. 61, 62, and 63). It
was testified th~t $650.00 was spent on these fences since
1940 (Tr. 179, lines 22 to 29).The four forty's were generally recognized, even
at the time of trial, as belonging to Miss Valborg Lowe,
or to her and her brother, the two appellants here (Tr.
131, lines 6 to 9).
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The land in litigation is bottom land (Tr. 60, line 11),
extends south from Highway 40 (Tr. 60, line 27, to Tr.
61, line 2), and can be seen from the highway (Tr. 67,
lines 5 to 8).
In the twelve years between the purchase of this land
on mortgage foreclosure until the date of trial, no taxes
were paid by the plaintiff, Bank of Vernal (S~ipulation,
Tr. 57, line 12, Tr. 58, line 24, to Tr. 59, line 5 ).
The defendant, P. H. Lowe, purchased the tax title
to the. property in 1945 (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1,
entry 28) and paid all the taxes thereafter to and including 1951, the taxes for 1946 and 1947 being paid in 1948,
and the 1948 taxes, in 1950, and the taxes for 1949, 1950,
and 1951, before delinquency (Stipulation, Tr. 57, lines
3 to 12; Tr. 58, line 24, to Tr. 59, line 5).
No taxes were legally assessed between 1928 and
1946, both inclusive, due to the failure to attach the required auditor's affidavit, none being attached prior to
1947 (Stipulation, Tr. 56, line· 20, to Tr. 57, line 1, and
Tr. 58, line 25, et seq.).
Even as to the taxes assessed for 1947 (paid in 1948
by P. H. Lowe), the auditor's affidavit required by Sections 80-7-9 to be affixed, and the one required by 80-87 to be attached, to the roll were only placed within a
loose-leaf binder along with the assessment sheets (Tr.
177, lines 15 to 26).
The Bank of Vernal bought the land for One ($1.00)
Dollar on foreclosure (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1,
entries 27 and 32), failed to pay any taxes in the 12 years
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it has held the land, and did not even record its deed
until eight years after the sale (Abstract of Title, Exhibit
1, entry 32).
The Bank of \ 7 ernal ha~ never been in possssion of
the disputed land at any time, although the cashier
elai1ned that he 'vas on the land once in the ·'early spring·"
of 1940 ( Tr. 1±S, line 2±).
The action was eon1n1enced June 3, 1948. Summons
·was served on the defendant County (Tr. 4) and defendant, P. H. Lo"~e, on July 7, 1948. (Tr. 5 ). These were the
only persons on whom process was served. A trial was
had :Jiarch 26, 1951 (Tr. 27). A motion to permit the
filing of an · Amended Answer and to reopen the trial
·was granted (Tr. -±2). When the case was tried October
15, 1951, a motion to strike the record of the previous
testimony (Tr. 28 to 37) was granted (Tr. 50). The trial
was had (Tr. 53 to 192); a decision in favor of the Bank
of ·v. ernal and against the defendant, .P. H. Lowe, was
entere~ (Tr. 195); an~ a decree quieting title to the land
in dispute in the Bank was signed and filed, subject to
the payment to defendant, P ~ H. Lowe, of $378.9'6 to
reimburse him for that amount paid to the 9ounty for a
t~.x ?eed and for tax redemption and: taxes and the further sum of $400.00 for improvement~ made.
The decree quieted title in favor· of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, and also against Miss Valborg
Lowe (Tr. 202), an4 was not a party to the. action. Both
she and her brother, P. H. Lowe, fil~.d separate appeals
(Tr. 204, 205), but for the purpose of the hearing the
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appeals were consolidated by order of this court. With
the permission of the court, because the facts are identical in the two appeals, this brief will present the argument of both appellants in order to save expense.
Let us first consider the appellant P. H. Lowe's
affirmative defense of title by
ADVERSE POSSESSION

What is adverse possession? The statutory declarations on the subject are these :
"Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land under claim of
title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree,
the land so actually occupied, and no other, is
deemed to have been held adversely." (Session
Laws of Utah, 1951, Section 104-12-10, Ch. 58,
p. 183.)
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by a person claiming title, not founded
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree
land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only :
" ( 1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
"(2) Where it has been usually cultivated
or improved.
"(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating
such lands arnounting to the sum of $5 per acre."
(Session Laws of Utah, Section 104-12-11, Ch. 58,
p. 183.)
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... In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any
section of this code, unless it shall be shown that
the land has been occupied and claimed for the
period of seven years continuously, and that the
party, his predecessors and grantors have paid
all taxes \vhich have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law." (Session Lav.rs
of lT ta.h, Section 104-12-12, Ch. 58, p. 183.)

1 Am. Jur. 793 states:

•· In order to bar the true owner of land fron1
recovering it from an occupant in adverse possession and claiming ownership through the operation of the Statute of Limitations, the possession
1nust have been for the whole period prescribed by
the statute, actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and hostile to the true owner's title and
to the world at large."
Does the defendant, P. H. Lowe, come within this
rule of law~
SUBSTANTIAL ENCLOSURE, 11\IPROVEMENTS

The land was fenced with a tight barbed and woven
wire fence ( Tr. 61, 62, 63, and 168, line 17), in which there
were no gates except those opening on the Lowe property (Tr. 62 and 63). According to the lower court's
finding, numbered "2," (Tr .. 200) the defendant, P. H.
Lowe, had expended $400.00 in maintenance of the property (Lowe testified it was $650.00), so that it has been
"protected by a

sub~tantial

inclosure" as required by

104-12-11(1), and it has been "improved" as required by
104-12-11 (2).
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ACTUAL, CONTINUAL USE

There was continual use by Defendant Lowe of the
land is dispute since 1934. Some sheep and cattle were
left there to pasture every day (Tr. 74, line 1, et seq.;
line 21). All the sheep were pastured there more or less
all the time (Tr. 75, line 21, et seq.). There were about
300 sheep (Tr. 76, line 15), and sometimes there were
just a few pastured there and, at other times, all of them
(Tr. 76, line 20). And a few of the cattle were pastured
there (Tr. 76, line 25, et seq.). This has been true of
all times since 1934 ( T.r. 74, line 1, et seq.; line 8 ; line 24;
line 28; Tr. 75, line 16). So there was actual, continuous
use.
OPEN, VISIBLE USE

The possession and use wa~ open and visible. It
was not secretive but continued during the day time. It
was used for pasturage (Tr. 64, lines 6 and 7) all the
time (Tr. 67, line 13). Lowe would drive the sheep down
in the morning ( Tr. -69, line 4) and leave them there all
day (Tr. 69, line 7). Mostly, the sheep were brought back
to the home corral every night (Tr. 69, lines 14 to 16).
The tracts in question are in the creek bottoms and can
be seen from U. S. Highway 40 (Tr. 60, line 27, to Tr. 61,
line 2). So, clearly, the use was open and visible.
It might be urged that there was no notice to the
Bank of Vernal. It is doubtful, even though such were
required, if it would be needed where there is so complete
abandonment of the land as shown h.ere. There was no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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actual or

con~tructive pos~e~~ion

by the Bank nor its pre-

dece~~or

in interest, Herron, from.,~934 on. Neithe~· :Herron, "~hose interests were ~or~closed in 1939, nor the
Bank .of \~ernal ever sought to. enter on or take possession
of the land or exercise any ownership or donlinion over
it by .lease or ?therwise. An~ the Bank of Vernal, after
the conten1ptuous purchase for One ($1.00) Dollar of
credit on the judgment obtained on the Herron mortgage, not only did nothing about taking possession of the
land, but paid no taxes and has not paid taxes to this day
(Tr. 57, line 12; Tr. 58, ~ine 24, to- Tr. 59, line 5). And
they did not even trouble to record their deed until eight
years after the sale, when oil had -~ade this land valuable to the1n. No clearer case of abandonment could be
found.
However,.if it sho~d be u~ged that l:lOtice of adverse.
claini should be given to the Bank spite ~f such aband.onment, this notice is generally only requisite where so
required by statute. In any case where the use is open,
-rl~ible, .arid notorious, tha~ is const;uctive notice and is
sufficient
(2 CJS 559).
.
.

m

NOTORIOUS USE

The claim of ownership 'by Lowe was well known
according to Mr. Gardner, a neighbor. to the north ( Tr.
131, lines 6 to 10), who says that people generally. thought
the·. four 40's_ belonged to Miss: Valbor_g Lowe, the nonparty appellant, or to her and her brother, Defendant
P. H. Lowe. So ·the use was notorious. There was no
evidence to the contrary.
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EXCLUSIVE USE

No one else ever used the property.
"Q. Has anyone had possession of it (the land
inlitigation) other than you~,
A. No." (Tr. 64, lines 18, 19).
"Q. I asked you if anyone used this land besides
you'
A. No." (Tr. 77, line 10).
"Q. Did you ever see anyone on the tracts A; B,
C' or D'
A .. See anyone what?
Q. Using the tracts A, B, C, or D 1
A. No.
Q. Ever see anybody plow it1 ·
A. No.
Q. Or run cattle or sheep on it~
MR. JOHNS-ON: We object. ...
THE COURT: : .Be: sustained."- (Tr. 66, line
23, et seq.)
- ·
:

-

:

There· is rio evidence of anyone's using the land except P. H. Lowe since 1934. A Mr. Seeley wanted the
Lowes to stay off the land in dispute because he was buying the land from the County. They in turn told him to
stay off (Tr. 127, liiles 7 to 15 ), and he kept off (Tr. 127,
~~~e 30) 1 · Only f·
Lowe·has had P.ossession of this land
(Tr. 77, line 10; Tr. 95, line 17).

:a.

UNINTERRUPTED USE
It might be urged that our use was interrupted in
1940 because the Bank's cashier, in response to the question, "Did you ever go upon the land during the year
1940, the tracts marked 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'D,' ~" answered,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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h

In .the early spring I did." ( Tr. 148, lines 22 to 24).

But for "~hat purpose this "~as done does not appear.
Nor does it appear that the entry was made for the- purpose of taking possession, nor that possession was taken
or attempted to be taken on that occasion.
But merely \valking across a part or all of'.the land
does not break the adverse possession. In Bingha.m
L~very & Transfer Co. v. j;JcDonald (110 P. 56, 61; 37
u. 45'7), after commenting on the adverse use of the lot
by defendant, the court said:
·~under

these circumstances t.he occasional
driving over the ground used as a yard by re.spondent in going to and ·coming from its barn
was in no sense an interference with· appellant's
. possession."
So, clearly, the going on the land on the one occasion for
an ·unkno\vn purpose could not be ·construed as an interference or interruption of the appellant P. H. Lowe's
possession. Nor is there any evide.nce that the- bank, or
its predecessors ·in· interest, at any time subsequent to
1934, ever exercised or attempt~d to exercise·towa.rd the
land in dispute any of the rights or attributes of possession.
ADVERSE USE

The use was adverse.

hQ •. Have you since 1934 claimed to own this
land~

. MR. JOHNSON:
the best evidence.

We object to that as not
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THE C·OURT: Be overruled. He may answer. . . .
A. Yes." (Tr. 77, lines 12 to 28).
He claimed the land from 1934 (Tr. 77, lines 12 to
28). He used it continually from 1934, some of P. H.
Lowe's cattle and sheep being on the land every day
('Tr. 74, line 6, et seq., line 28, et seq.; Tr. 75, line 16).
(There was sorne question raised as to whether the sheep
belonged to hiffi or to his sister or to both, but as to the
cattle no question was raised.) No one else had possession of the land (Tr. 64, lines ·18, 19; Tr. 77, line 10; Tr.
95, line 17). No one has been on the land ( Tr. 66, lines
23, et seq.) except possibly the cashier of the Bank of
Vernal, who stated he was on it once in the early spring
of 1940 (Tr. 148, lines 22 to 24) for an unknown purpose.
Lowe stated, in answer to the inquiry as to when he
started claiming it as his own, that it was after he bought
it from the County (Tr. 93, lines 12 to 14) and then that,
before he bought it from the County, he claimed to own it
"in a 'vay" ( Tr. 93, line 18), and in explanation he said,
''Well, oh never been any objections for clailning," (Tr.
93, line 29) and, "Oh, I figured more or less right to it.
Always had. Just as much as anyone else. . . . Nobody
else took possession of it and make use of it. Nobody told
me to stay off" (Tr. 95, lines 8 to 12).
That is the testiinony as to intention, but his acts
'vere unequivocal. He improved it "'·ith tight, barbed
and woven wire fences (Tr. 61, 62), the north two forty's
being each entirely enclosed, the south two being fenced
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as a unit (Tr. 63), but all four being enclosed, with the
only openings in the fences being located between the
land in litigation and the Defendant Lowe's property
(Tr. 62, 63). The sum of $400.00 was expended on improving the land (Finding of Fact No.2), while the testimony "\Vas that a total of $650.00 was spent in improving
the fences (Tr. 179, line 22).
In Toltec Ranch Company v. Babcock (66 P. 876, 24
U. 1S3), the defendant and her predecessors in interest
had been in possession of the property for twenty years
or more and had cut hay and lived off the land. They had
built a log cabin, a pole corral, and a cellar and had partially fenced the area. It had been known as the "Loveland
Place" (previous name of defendant). Concerning this
possession the court, after referring to the statute, said:
"The land "\Vas occupied and used the same as
other lands were in that neighborhood. The possession,. as appears from the evidence, was open,
notorious, uninterrupted, and peaceable, and under a claim of right. It must, therefore, necessarily be deemed to have been adverse to the
holder of the legal title, and such long-continued
possession may be deen1ed to have been adverse
though not in its character hostile. 'Where one is
shown to have been in possession of land for the
period of limitation, apparently as owner, and
such possession is not explained or otherwise accounted for, it will be presumed to have been adverse.' 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 889,
890; 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th Ed.) 159, par. 43.
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The possession and occupancy, under the circumstances herein admitted and proved, were notice to
all the world of the possessor's rights, and prim~
facie evidence of property, and of a seisin in
fee; and, the longer the possession was continued
undisturbed, the stro.uger becamt.. the conclusion
that there was a legal origin for it. Busw. Lim.
Sec. 2. 'Every possession is taken to be on the
possessor's own title until the contrary· appears,
as the possession is in itself the strongest evidence of the claim of title, and, when long continued, of the title also.' Jackson v. Hillsborough
Co1n'rs., 18 N. C. 177. In Patterson v. Reigle, 4
Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684, on the question of adverse possession, Mr. Chief Justice Gibson said:
'There is a presumption, which lasts till it is rebutted, that an intruder enters to hold for himself; and it is not to be doubted that a trespasser
entering to gain a title, though conscious that he
is a wrongdoer, will accomplish his object, if the
owner do not enter or prosecute his claim within
the prescribed period. But to do so it is necessary
that his possession be adverse from the first, and
to infer that he intended it to be otherwise would
impute to him an inconsistency of purpose." (Italics added).
The court then proceeds to quote fro1n the United
States Supre1ne Court as follows:
"Mr. Justice Baldwin, in Boone v. Chiles, 10
Pet. 177, 223, 9 L. Ed. 388, 'speaking for the supreme court of the United States, said: 'The
possession of land is notice of a claim to it by the
possessor~ Sugd. Vend. 753. If not taken and held
by contract or purchase, it is frorn its inception
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adverse to all the world, and in twenty years bars
the owner in law and equity.'" (Italics added).
~\.ffirn1ed, Toltec 12. Babcock, 191 U. S. 542, 48 L.
Ed. ~4, 24 S. Ct. 169.
It might be urged that the case pf Pione,er Invest-

ment and Trust Co. v. Board of Education (99 P. 150,
35 U 1) is applicable because of the statements made by
P. H. Lo"~e, as above set out. It will be recalled that in
the Pioneer ease the court, by way of dicta., said that pas~ive possession \vas insufficient grounds upon which to
base adverse possession. Then the court there went on to
say, "Whenever the possession is of such a character that
ownership n1ay be inferred th~refrom, then the possession ordinarily may be presumed to be hostile to the
rights of the true owner. . . ."
In the case at bar the land was wholly enclosed \vith
a tight barbed wire and a tight barbed and woven wire
fence \vhich had no openings except into Defendant
.Lowe's land. ·The land was constantly used by the Defendant Lowe and by him only, and such was open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive, etc. Certainly such a
possession is one opposed to that of the holder of the
legal title.
ILL WILL IS NO REQUISITE;
CLAIM, IF OTHER THAN SUBORDINATE TO LEGAL
OWNER, IS SUFFICIENT

In 2

c·Js 570, it is said:

"The term 'hostile,' as used in connection with
the rule that possession requisite to a title by
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liinitation must be hostile in character, does not
import enmity or ill will, but rather imports that
claimant is in possession as owner in contradistinction to holding in recognition of, or in subordination to, the true owner."

In Davis v. Waggoner, 83 NE 381, 42
court said:

In~.

A 115, the

','Every possession, then, is adverse and entitled to the peaceful and benignant operation and
protecting safeguard of the statute, which is not
in subservice to the title of another. . . ."
Where the court upheld a claim of adverse possession, in Pacifiq Power & Light Co. v. Bailey, 295 P. 943,
160 Wn 663, the court said:
'

'

" '.We have not overlooked the argument of
the appellants that to constitute adverse possession the possession must have been hostile in its
inception. . . . But the term 'hostile' as here used
does not import enmity or ill will, but rather impQrts that the claimant is in possession as owner,
in contradistinction to holding in recognition of
or subordination to the true owner~ 2 C.J. 122.' "
The same court in Fisher and Hagstrom 214 P. 2d
654, 35 Wn 2d 632 said on the same subject:
"Appellants argue that there is no evidence
of 'hostile intent' on the ·part of respondents.
Apparently appellants have misconstrued the
legal meaning of the term 'hostile intent' for, as
we said in Young v. Newbro, Wash., 200 P. 2d
97·5, the term 'hostile' does not import enmity or
ill-will, but rather imports that the claimant is in
possession as owner, in contradistinction to posSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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session of real property in recognition of or subordination to the title of the true owner. See,
also, Bowden-Gazzman Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wash.
2d 27, 154 P. 2d 285, 289."
See also Roesch vs. Gerst, 138 P. 2d 846, 851, 18 Wn.
2d 294.
~

The :Jfontana court recognized this doctrine in Price
v. Western. Life ln.s'Uran.ce Co., 146 P. 2d 165, at 167, 115
Mont. 509, 'vhere the court said:
" 'Hostile" as used in the books in relation to
the adverse possession of land does not mean, to
use the language of distinguished counsel, that
one 'must run off the legal owner from the land
with a pitchfork,' but we think it necessarily
must mean an invasion of the owner's possession
by the claimant without the owner's- permission
and in violation of the owner's right of property."
In Cool v. Kelly, 80 NW 861, 78 Minn. 102, the subject was before' the court, and an adverse possession was
upheld, the court saying in part:

"If he took and held possession with the intention of holding the tract for himself, to the exclusion of all others, his possession was hostile
and adverse. An adverse intent to oust the owner
may be generally evidenced by the character of
the possession and the acts of ownership of the
occupant."
The Michigan Court said there was a presun1ption
of hostility under certain conditions in Green v. Anglemire, 43 NW 772, 774, 77 Mich. 168.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

"When the possession is by actual occupation
by the possessor, or his· tenants under claim of
title, his possession is visible, open, notorious and
distinct, and will be presumed to be hostile."
The Nebraska court in passing on an adverse possession case in Ballard v. Hansen, 51 NW 295, 33 Neb.
86, referred to the Webster dictionary definition wherein
the word ~'hostile" is associated with •'enemy," etc., and
then said that such was not the import of the word in adverse possession cases and explained the change thus
(5i NW 295):
"The word seems to have come into use in
this connection at a time when the stat-qte of limitations was looked on with disfavor, and the courts
were disposed, if possible, to defeat all claims of
the adverse clai~ant. At the present time the
statute is viewed with favor as one of repose....
where such occupation has 'been adverse, open,
notorious, and exclusive for the statutory period,
that is sufficient. The word 'hostile' therefore
does not correctly express the character of the
occupancy required. . . ."
A similar test of adverse use has been applied by
the Utah court in some easement cases. In Zollinger v.

Frank, 175 P.· 2d 714, 716, 110 U. 514, the court said:
" ... That j·s, where a claimant has shown
an open and continuous use of the land for the
prescriptive period (20 years in Utah) the use will
be presumed to have been against the owner and
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the
prescriptive easement from arising has the bur-
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den of showing that the use was wnder him instead
of against him. This rule was mentioned in the
recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.
v. ~foyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (on rehearing) 174
P. 2d 148, 155, where it was said: 'It is true that
to establish an easement the use 1nust be notorious
and continuous and on this adverseness-that is,
holding against the O'\\'~er-will be presumed.'
See also Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western
Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771 ; Eagle
Rock Corporation v. Idamont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho
413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal.
28, 87 P. 908; Stetson v. Youngquist, 76 Mont~
600, 248 p. 196."
There is no showing that the occupancy since 1934
was under the Bank of Vernal, or its predecessor in interest, Mr. Herron. No permission was ever sought or
obtained. Both o'vners abandoned the property as worthless. The Bank of Vernal thought this land so worthless that it would not pay anything for the land and
credited its judgment on tnortgage foreclosure in cause
No. 1901 with only One ($1.00) Dollar for the land (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1, entry 27) and never paid a cent
of taxes on the land from the foreclosure in 1939 to the
day of trial (Stipulation, Tr. 57, lines 12, 29 and 30; Tr.
58, lines 25 to 30; Tr. 59, lines 1 to 5). The Bank of Ver.. nal did not even record its deed until eight years after
it bought the land (Abstract of Title, Exhibit 1, entry
32).
No evidence was introduced that the occupancy of
Defendant Lowe was "under" the Bank of Vernal. In
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view of the above authorities, such occupancy as has been
shown here is hostile and adverse, as those words are defined.
·
The Defendant Lowe has shown, without contradiction, that his occupancy since 1934 was actual, open,
apparent, notorious, uninterrupted, exclusive, and "hostile," as that word is defined.
The presumption ("If not taken and held by contract
or purchase, it is fro1n its inception adverse to all the
world. . . .") which this court announced in the T·oltec
case, supra (66 P. 876, 24 U. 183), and again in the
Bingham Liv-ery v. McDonald case, supra (110 P. 56, 37
U. 457), is applicable to the case at bar. There is not
a scintilla of evidence to the contrary. The only deduction possible is that the possession was adverse.
PAYMENT OF TAXES

There is one more element to be considered in the
matter of adverse possession and that is .the payment of
taxes required under Section 104-12-12. The requirement
is for the payment of all taxes which have been assessed.
This has been interpreted as meaning only those taxes
which have been lawfully assessed.
"If, however, no taxes were lawfully assessed
or levied against the premises so claimed and
occupied by them, they could acquire title by adverse possession without payment of taxes."
(Utah Copp~r Co. v. Chandler, 142 P. 1119, 45 lT.
85.)
What is the tax situation~ It was stipulated that
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no taxes were legally assessed between 1928 and 1947
(Tr. 56, line 20, to Tr. 57, line 1, and Tr. 58, line 25).
Since no taxes \vere legally assessed between 1928 and
19±7, any seven years bet,veen 1934 and 1947, '\vhen this
court finds all of the elements for adverse possession
were present, \vould be sufficient to sustain Lowe's
claiin of title by adverse possession. We submit all of the
elen1ents w·ere present in the years 1935 to 1941, inclusive, and in each year after that to include the group 1940
to 1946, inclusive.
But, if for any reason it ~hould be necessary to look
to the payment of taxes for 1947, there are these matters
to consider: "\\Tffile the 1947 taxes were not paid until
1948 (Stipulation, Tr. 57, line 4), all the taxes have been
paid by the Defendant Lowe and none by the Bank of
\Ternal on their One ($1.00) Dollar investment. But were
the taxes, beginning even with 1947, legally assessed f
The law requires that the auditor "attach" his affidavit under Section 80-8-7. Concerning not only the
legality but the importance of attaching his affidavit,
the court, in the case of Telonis v. Staley (144 P. 2d 513,
517, 104 U. 537) said:
'·. . . The property owner is entitled to rely
on such verification and the treasurer is bound
thereby and he is required to proceed to issue the
tax notices in accordance therewith, and to collect
the taxes based on the computations of the auditor. The final affidavit of the auditor thus becomes highly in1portant, and in the absence of any
curative provision in the statutes for failure of the
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auditor to subscribe to and attach such . certificate
of authentication in affidavit form, the requirement of the stahJte must be observed."
The affidavit for the 1947 tax roll was merely '~in
~erted in this loose-leaf binder along with the asses~
ment sh~ets" (Tr. 177, lines 17 and 18). Is this the attachment required by statute1 If it can be attached by
merely being placed in the binder with the assessment
sheets, would it not also be attached by a paper clip?
There is nothing permanent about either attachment.
And the assessments could be changed as readily with
one meth.od as with the other. There is no element of
p~rmanency about a loose-leaf book. The pages can be
substituted at will. That is the very purpose of using
such a book. But if the affidavit must be attached to the
tax roll it should be attached so that a ·substitution of
assessment sheets cannot be made. If it is important that
the roll carry the _imprint of the auditor's certificate of
authenticity,. then should not these sheets be fastened together. to guarantee, in some manner, that they are the
sheets which the auditor says contain the assessments
and all subsequent changes 1 This could be done by attaching all sheets securely to his affidavit, as by binding
or by running a ribbon or string through and attaching
them to his affidavit with sealing wax, as has been done
fo~ hundreds· of years, or by having the auditor's affidavit on each sheet if the 'loose-leaf method is to be used.
As this court has said, this affidavit is "highly inlportant." It should be attached so that substitution can• )
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not be n1ade and ~o that those using and inspecting the
roll \Vill kno\v that the affidavit applies to the sheet under
consideration. The 19-!7 tax roll did not have the auditor's affidavit attached as required. There was no tax
legally assessed in 1947. So, even if it is necessary to
include 1947 in the computation of the seven years, no
legal assessment \vas n1ade and no taxes were required
to be paid.
Now, turning from our affirmative defense of adverse possession, it is also our position that the Bank of
\Ternal cannot recover because its right of action is barred by the
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Sections 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 provide that no action shall b~ commenced, etc., unless the moving party
\vas seized or possessed of the land within seven years.
MEANING OF "SEIZED"

It is evident that neither the Bank of Vernal nor its
predecessor was in possession of the land sought, within
the requisite seven years or at all. Can the Bank escape
the restriction by the claim that it was "seized" within
seven years' That word has been accorded several meanings, including that of a right to possession (see Black's
Law Dictionary). But,' as the court stated in Ford v.
Garner's .Adm. (49 Ala. 603), it has no accurate meaning
(see also 57 CJ 100). If we accord it the meaning of right
to possession, ho\Y will it \York out in the light of our
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statutes~

Section 104-12-5 permits an action if the one
bringing it has either been in possession for seven years
or. (if we accord "seize" the meaning .of the right to possession) has had within seven years the right to possession ·of: the property. Since the owner has the rigpt to
possession until it is barred by the statute, this would
result in a period of seven years after loss of possession
and then a second period of seven years after the loss
of the right to possession, or fourteen years within which
an action might be brought. This would bring about a
startling result in our limitations of. action, one quite
foreign to the other limitations and to our practice. Has
"seized" any definition more within reason?
"Seizin in fact or in deed is actual possession," while seizin in law is "a bare right to possess or to occupy the land. . . ." (57 CJ 103).
" 'Seizin' and 'possession,' as now understood,
mean the same thing." (Savage v. Savage, 23 P.
890, 891, 19 Ore. 112). Quoted with approval in
; Carlson v. Sullivan, 146 F'ed. 476 at 478.)
"Seizin and possession are treated as synonymous, meaning that possession which is held under
. claim of title." (Woolfolk v. Buckner, 55 SW 168,
9 ; 67 Ark. 411, 12.)
·In Minnesota, where the statute of limitations "provides that no such action shall be brought unless the
plaintiff, his ancestor,predecessor, or grantor was seized
or possess.ed of the premises in question within 20 years
before the commencement of the action," the. court stated:
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~~The

term 'seized' in the statute is not used in
contradistinction to •possessed' so as to admit of
an interpretation that the legal title or ownership only 'vould be sufficient to prevent the statute running as against the true owner though a
stranger be in the actual occupancy, pedis possessione, of the land in dispute. . . . There can be
but one actual seizin, and this necessarily includes
possession; and hence an actual possession in hostility to the true O\vner works a disseizin, and if
the disseizor is suffered to remain continually
in possession· for the statutory period, the remedy
of the former is extinguished. Melvin v. Proprietors, etc., 5 ~Ietcalf 33; Fowle v. Ayer, 8 NH 57;
Sedg. & W., Title to Land, sec. 728, 737; Woods,
Lim sec. 256" Seymour Sabin & Co. v. Carli, 16
NW 495, 31 Minn. 81.
That the word "seized" is used as opposed to disseizin finds support in the Utah case of Hammond v.
Johnson, 66 P. 2d 894, 94 U. 20. There the suit involved
a claim of adverse possession of water. In the course of
the opinion, the court quoted with approval from Words
and Phrases (66 P. 2~ 898):
"To constitute 'adverse possession' the possession must be actual, for otherwise there is no
disseizin, and the real owner remains in possession actually or constructively."
It is submitted that the only way to escape the inequitable result of a 14-year statute of limitations in adverse possession cases is to i~terpret "seized" as "seized
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seized." Such an interpretation would avoid the double
statutory period and accord with our practice and also
with the authorities just cited. That is the meaning of
"seized" as used in our statute. Such being the case,
the fact that the Bank. of Vernal and its predecessor in
interest were not seized nor possessed within the seven
years of June 3, 1948, the action is barred by the statute
of limitations.
Let us turn to some of the cases on the subject. Our
Section 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 are identical to Sections
318 and 319 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
The following are some of the cases. decided under the
comparable sections of the California statutes.
In Haney v. Kinevan, 166 P. 2nd 361, 73 Cal. A. 2d
34H, the action was to quiet title. There the court said:
"This is the sole question necessary for us to
determine:
"Were plaintiffs bar!ed by the provisions of
section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure from
maintaining the present action?
"This question must be answered in the af. firmative and is governed by the following pertinent rules of law:
"(1) An action for the recovery of rea]
property cannot be maintained unless the person
. asserting the cause of action or under whose title
the action is prosecuted, or the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person has been seized
or possessed of the property in question \vithin
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five years before the conunencen1ent of the action
to enforce such right or claim. (Code of Civi]
Procedure, section 318; Housing Authority· v.
Pirrone, 65 Cal. App. 2d 566, 151 P. 22, and cases
therein ri ted.)
·· ( ~) An action to quiet title to real prop
erty is an action for the recovery thereof within
the meaning of section 318 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. (South Tule Independent Ditch Co.
v. King, 1-!-! Cal. -!50, 453, 77 P. 1032; Townsend
v. Driver. 3 Cal. App. 581, 583, 90 P. 1071.)
~- (3)

The burden of proof is upon plaintiffs
to show that they or their ancestors, predecessors
or the grantors of such persons have been seized
or possessed of the property in question within
five years before the commencement of the action.
(Patchett v. Webber, 198 Cal. 440, 451, 245 P.
422; ~r\.kley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 209 P. 576.)
" (4) Where no evidence is introduced in
support of an issue findings should be made thereon against the party 'vho has the burden of proof.
( 24 Cal. J ur. ( 1926) , p. 945, sec. 189.)
"(5) Applying the foregoing rules to the
facts in the instant case, since plaintiffs concede
that there 'vas no evidence that they were in possession of the disputed property within five years
before 1\Iay 10, 1938, the date the present action
was commenced, the trial court properly found
as an ultimate fact 'That it is true that the cause
of action set out in plaintiff's complaint is barred
by the provisions of section 318 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of the State of California.' "
In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670, 58 U. 418,
this matter of the burden of proof arose. The owner
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of the legal title sued one who claimed the property by
adverse possession. The owne.r won in the lower court,
and the adverse claimant appealed. Aft~r referring to
what is now Sections 104-12-5 and 104-12-6 this court
said that the burden of proof, when these sections are
pleaded by way of defense, is upon the holder of the
legal title.
··we have purposefully indulged in considerable detail in stating respondents' position and the
basis of their contention for the reason that, in
view of the statutes quoted upon which appellants
rely, it seems to the court that the burden rests
upon the respondents to show why the statutes
pleaded by appellants do not apply in the present
case."
In the case at bar, as in the Haney case, supra, there
was no evide.nce that the holder of the legal title had been
in possession within seven years; and, since the burden
is upon the holder of the legal title to affirmatively establish possessi~n, the plaintiff~s action must fail.
LIMITATIONS ARE INDEPENDENT OF ADVERSE
'- POSSESSION
There is a tendency to constru·e the seven-year statute of limitations as though it were merged in the provisions relating to adverse possession and as ·though the
seven-year prohibition had no application unle~s title by
adverse possession could be proven. Of course, the two
are different. For instance, in case of the removal of
ore where no attempt is 1nade to claim by adverse pos-
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session, the seYen-year statute (104-12-G) \vould yet govern. Is it not possible that, \vhere there has been a disseizen, the statute of lin1itations would apply even though
all the required elen1ent~ of adverse possession 'vere not
present 1 Such ha~ been held to be the case.

In Cocking r. Fulwider, 273 Pac. 142, 95 Cal. A. 745,
the action was brought to quiet title to a disputed boundary strip. The court held that the action was barred
because of Section 318, Code of Civil Procedure.
'·. . . The evidence was that the respondents
and their predecessors were in undisputed actual
possession of the land for more than 30 years and
that appellant had not made any claim of right or
possession during that period except the ineffectual attempt to fence t~e property. immediately
prior to the commencement of the suit. The purpose of the Code section is to prevent the prosecution- of stale demands such as we have here,
and for this purpose it limits the remedy of the
plaintiff, even though all the elements necessary
to_ esta.blish_ adverse possession on defendant's
part a.re not present. (Italics ours.) This distinction is emphasized in Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal.
625, 647, 209 P. 576, and the rule of that case supports the conclusion of the trial court that appellant may not maintain his action."
In Fickeisen v. Peebler, 219 P. 2d 864, 98 Cal. A. 2d
320, in 1926, a corporation, after its charter had been revoked, conveyed this land in litigation. For 18 years
after that it was held by the grantee and its assigns.
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Then an action was commenced by the trustee for the
corporation to quiet title. The court refused to do· so, saying on page 866 :
"The finding that the action was barred under
section 318, Code of Civil Procedure, is supported
by evidence that Fickeisen, as trustee, or Graceland, was not seized or possessed of the property
within five years immediately preceding the commencement of the action. Cocking v. FUlwider, 95
Cal. App. 7·45, 273 P. 142; Morrow v. Coast Land
Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 111, 84 P. 2d 301; Earl
v. Lofquist, 135 Cal. App. 373, 379, 27 P. 2d 416."

In Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 84 P. 2nd 301, 29 Cal.
A. 2d 92, the action was ·brought to quiet title to 480 acres
of oil land on the north dome of Kettleman Hills. Entry
was made by the plaintiffs under a claim for oil in 1909.
They then contracted with Ochsner to drill wells on the
. property. He did so in 1911; but thereafter, in 1920 "rhen
a leasing act was passed by Congress, he took a lease
in his own name which he assigned to the defendant company in 1924. c·oncerning the application of Section 318
of the Code of Civil Procedure to this case, the court
said:
~'As

the prospecting permit and the lease constituted interests in real property adverse and
hostile to the title of the members of the Morrow
group, it follows that the action to recover an interest in the Ian~ (if it be such) was barred in five
years after the date ofthat permit or the date of
the lease, assuming they (the Morrow group or its
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successors) 'vere then in possession. Sec. 318,
Code C~iv. Proc.; Earl v. Lofquist, 135 Cal. App.
373, :?7 P. 2d 416; Cocking v. Fulwider, 95 Cal.
App. 7-±5, 273 P. 142."
In Earl v. Lofquist, 27 P. 2d 416, 135 Cal. A. 373,
the suit was for fraud of the directors whereby one of
their number was let into possession of land. This action
seeks to quiet title against the director. Concerning the
matter, the court said :
··The provisions of section 318 are pleaded by
way of den1urrer to that portion of the amended
complaint designated as the second cause of action. . . . It affirmatively appearing from the
amended complaint that respondent has been in
possession of the property since the date of the
transaction complained of, over eleven years before the action was commenced, the demurrer
thereto was properly sustained on this ground."
In Ho,using Authority v. Pirrone, 151 P. 2d 22, 65
Cal. A. 2d 566, the action was brought to condemn property, and an appeal was taken from the judgment of
condemnation whereby the defendant, Cunningham, received nothing by way of compensation. Concerning the
matter of the statute of limitations, the court said:
"Second: Was defendant barred by S.eetions
318 and 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure from
asserting any interest or claim in or to the property described in the complaint'
"This question must also be answered in the
affirmative. The law is established in California
that a cause of action arising out of the title to
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real property, or to rents or profits of the same
cannot be maintained unless the person asserting
the cause of action or under whose title the action
· is prosecuted, or the ancestor, predecessor or
grantor of such person has been seized or possessed of the property in question within five
years before the commencement of the action to
enforce such right or claim. Sections 318 and 319
of the Code of Civil Procedure; Akley v. Bassett,
189 Cal. 625, 645, 209 P. 576; Morrow v. Coast
Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 111, 84 P. 2d 301;
Cocking v. Fulwider, 95 Cal. App. 745, 747, 273 P.
142."
During the oral argument in the lower court,
the Judge asked the effect of ruling that the statute of limitations applied without having adverse possession. This matter was discussed in the case of A.kley

v. Bassett, in 209 P. 576, 189 Cal. 625, which was an action for partition of certain lands. Concerning the matter here in issue, the court said:
"The only provisions of the Code that seem to
have any application to this phase of the case are
· sections 318 and 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 1007 of the Civil Code. The two
former prescribe seizing within a period of five
years before the comme-ncement of the action as
a necessary condition of the right to maintain the
same. They affect only the remedy, i.e., the action,
or means given by the law for the recovery of a
right, but not the right itself."
The same thing is true with reference to the statute
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of limitations operating to bar an action on a note and
n1ortgage. The action is barred, and yet the note and
obligation to pay still re1nain, even though unenforceable.
The note can be the consideration for a new pron1ise to
pay, and the n1ortgagor 'vill find that he cannot reinove
the cloud of the n1ortgage on his property. Coming to a
quiet title action, even though the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, unless the statute is plead, it is no
bar. In other \vords, the title remains even though the
remedy does not.
Perhaps it would not be am1ss to quote again the
Cocking case in 273 P. 142 and 143, where the court said:
"The purpose of the Code section is to prevent the prosecution of stale demands such as we
have~ here, and for this purpose it limits the
remedy of the plaintiff, even though all the ele-

ments necessary to establish adverse possession
on defen.dant' s part are not present." (Italics
ours.)
'~The

statute of limitations is now generally regarded

as a statute of repose." (Frick J. in Gibson v. Jensen,
158 P. 426, 428, 48 U. 244.) Certainly if Section 104-12-

5 is accorded any meaning, then the conclusion is unescapable that the plaintiff who sues for the recovery of
land must have been in possession of the property within
the period of ~rs before the commencement of the
action. It is uncontroverted that the Bank of Vernal has
never been in possesdion of this property at alL The stat-
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ute of limitations prevents it from recovering on its action to quiet title, regardless of whether the defendant
is entitled to recover on adverse possession or not.

JUDGMENT AGAINS.T ONE, NOT A PARTY
T~ere

is one more element to be considered and that
is the decree against appellant, Valborg B. T. Lowe.
As pointed out above, she was not a party to the litiga- ,
tion at all. Her first "Appearance" was as a judgment
· defendant.
The case of Ho-user v. Smith, 56 P. 683, 19 U. 150,
related to a proceeding wherein a juqgment was rendered
against persons not. parties to the suit. Concerning this
the court said (56 P. 685) :
". . . The record presents a case where the
judgment is shown to be absolutely void, and rendered against persons who were not before the
court, and over whom the court had no jurisdiction. Courts have no right to dispose of and adju~icate upon the property rights of persons who
are not parties to the case, and who are total
strangers to the record. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack,
Section 16, 494; Mosby v. Gisborn, 54 Pac. 121,
17 Utah ------·"
Certainly there can be no question but that the judgment herein should be reversed as to Volberg B. T. Lowe.
It is submitted that it should also be reversed as to
P. H. Lowe . because he has clearly established his right
to title by adverse possession, and, even if he should fail

'
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there, because the seven-year statute of litnitations barH
this stale demand by the Bank of \'ernal. Both the Bank
and its predecessor in interest, Mr. Herron, regarded the
property as worthless. Fron1 1934 on, the property was
left 'vithout any indicia of 0"\\,.nership exercised by either
Herron or the Bank. Neither leased the property; neither
farmed it or used it; neither took steps to keep up the
fences; and neither paid any taxes on the property. The
Bank regarded it as \vorthless and allowed a credit of
only One ($1.00) Dollar on its judgment, so that it could
reach some chattels. But the Bank never took possession
of the land nor exercised any jurisdiction over it. The
Bank did not even record its deed until eight years after
it became the owner. The Bank is now seeking to enforce a very, very stale demand, nine years after it
"washed its hands" of the land. The Bank, activated by
the desire to gain whatever wealth oil will bring to the
owners of this land, now, after nine years of it~ own
inaction and four years of its predecessor's seeks to take
this 160 acres from the man who has struggled to eke
out an existence on this land. Such stale demands are
not favored. The decree should be reversed.
IRWIN CLAWSON,
Attorney for Defendants
and AppeUwnts.
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